Bridging Language With the Rest of Cognition: Computational, by Algorithmic And Neurobiological & Shimon Edelman
Bridging language with the rest of cognition: computational,
algorithmic and neurobiological issues and methods
Shimon Edelman
Department of Psychology
232 Uris Hall, Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-7601, USA
http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/∼edelman
March 7, 2004
Abstract
The computational program for theoretical neuroscience proposed by Marr and Poggio (Marr and
Poggio, 1977) calls for a study of biological information processing on several distinct levels of ab-
straction. At each of these levels — computational (deﬁning the problems and considering possible
solutions), algorithmic (specifying the sequence of operations leading to a solution) and implementa-
tional — signiﬁcant progress has been made in the understanding of cognition. In the past three decades,
computational principles have been discovered that are common to a wide range of functions in percep-
tion (vision, hearing, olfaction) and action (motor control). More recently, these principles have been
applied to the analysis of cognitive tasks that require dealing with structured information, such as visual
scene understanding and analogical reasoning. Insofar as language relies on cognition-general principles
and mechanisms, it should be possible to capitalize on the recent advances in the computational study of
cognition by extending its methods to linguistics.
Much of the discussion surrounding the integration of linguistics with the other cognitive sciences has
traditionally been focusing on arguments for (Linebarger, 1989) and against (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Bates,
1994) the modular (Fodor, 1983) status of language. Even if language is a module, however, it may still
rely on the same computational principles (in the sense of Marr (Marr and Poggio, 1977)), and may be
supported by the same mechanisms, as the other cognitive functions. To explore this possibility, we need
to bring together ideas from several ﬁelds. The ﬁrst of these is cognitive linguistics (Langacker, 1987) —
a natural home for the integration project. This discipline consistently produces valuable insights into the
psychology of language, yet is little concerned with algorithmic or implementational issues. The second
is computational linguistics (Jurafsky and Martin, 2000) (including statistical natural language processing
(Manning and Sch¨ utze, 1999)), a ﬁeld that examines the mathematical nature of language-related tasks and
generates important applications, yet pays little attention to behavioral or neurobiological issues. Lastly,
there is the Marr-Poggio computational framework (Marr and Poggio, 1977), which is used across cognition
and which spans all the relevant levels of analysis, but has not yet been extended to the study of language.
This chapter discusses some of the general computational principles that emerge as useful for under-
standing cognition, focusing on those that are likely to be especially relevant in dealing with structured
knowledge. It then brings these principles to bear on a theory of language that is rooted both in cognitive
and in computational linguistics, and that views language as an incrementally learnable system of redundant,
distributed representations akin to those found by neurobiologists in olfaction, audition and vision.
11 Common principles of cognitive representation and processing
The view that cognition hinges on internal representation of knowledge (Chomsky, 1957; Miller, 1962) is
widely accepted in linguistics, psychology and neuroscience. A representational state in a cognitive sys-
tem is characterized by its covariation with certain aspects of the relevant state of affairs in the world, and,
crucially, by having counterfactually supported effects on the rest of the system (in linguistics, this corre-
sponds to the requirement of psychological reality (Fodor et al., 1974; Edelman and Christiansen, 2003)).
The reality of a representation can be indicated by double dissociation (in patients (Damasio and Tranel,
1993) or normal subjects (Pulverm¨ uller et al., 1996)) or by priming (behavioral (Tulving and Schacter,
1990; Ochsner et al., 1994) or neural (Wiggs and Martin, 1998)), and its causal effectiveness — by direct
intervention, such as microampere-level current injection at the appropriate brain site which brings about
the predicted perceptual/behavioral change (Salzman et al., 1990).
Theories that posit distributed, overlapping, graded representations (Pouget et al., 2000) have enjoyed
considerable explanatory success in contexts as diverse as olfaction, vision, reasoning and memory. In
particular, researchers are now able to identify a few classes of computational processes, operating over
distributed representations, that are common to a wide range of cognitive tasks. Some examples of such
general-purpose computational building blocks of biological information processing are: (1) density es-
timation and hypothesis weighting in the service of probabilistic inference (e.g., in conceptual learning
(Tenenbaum, 1999) and in vision (Kersten and Schrater, 2000)); (2) function approximation in the service of
learning from examples (e.g., in vision (Poggio and Edelman, 1990) and in motor control (Poggio, 1990)),
and (3) dimensionality reduction in the service of feature detection and categorization (e.g., in language
(Landauer and Dumais, 1997) and in vision (Intrator and Edelman, 1997)).
In some cases, these abstract principles have been mapped onto the function of the brain and its circuitry,
resulting in explanatory models that span all three levels of Marr’s program. For example, in olfaction
the anatomy and the physiology of the pathway leading from the sensory epithelium to the glomeruli in
the olfactory bulb (Lancet, 1991; Shepherd, 1992) can be seen as ﬁltering data through a bank of radial
basis functions (Poggio, 1990). This operation implements what is known to be a universal approximation
algorithm (Hartman et al., 1990) that can be used in learning from examples (Poggio, 1990). The same
algorithmic approach can support visual object recognition, as demonstrated by the Chorus of Prototypes
model (Edelman, 1999), in which the stimulus is represented by its similarities to (processed) memory traces
of past stimuli. Recent single-cell studies in the monkey found neurons that are broadly and redundantly
tuned to particular object categories (Freedman et al., 2001) and that embody an ensemble representation of
inter-object similarities that is veridical with respect to the distal stimuli (Op de Beeck et al., 2001). Both
these ﬁndings had been predicted by the Chorus of Prototypes model (Edelman, 1998; Edelman, 1999).
2 Dealing with structure: a special challenge?
To be relevant to language, the computational principles behind these ﬁndings must be extended to situations
that require highly structured representations. Recent work in various areas of cognition has been pursuing
precisely such an extension. For example, in complex analogy tasks a similarity-based model performs very
well when the distributed representations it uses are made to reﬂect the structure of the input (Plate, 1995;
Eliasmith and Thagard, 2001). Likewise, in vision the Chorus of Fragments model (derived from the Chorus
of Prototypes), which aims at dealing with structured objects and scenes (Edelman and Intrator, 2003), is
based on the twin principles of distributed representation by similarities (mentioned above) and of the use
of visual space to anchor the various shape fragments (cf. (Edelman, 2002)), introduced next.
22.1 The role of space in representing structure
The idea that space should serve as a natural scaffolding for supporting structured representations, whose
roots go back to the ancient mnemonic Method of Loci ((Neisser, 1976), p.137), is stated forcefully in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ((Wittgenstein, 1961), proposition 3.1431):
The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clean when we imagine it made up
of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial
position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.
In vision, sorting shape cues by their location in the visual ﬁeld goes a long way towards solving the binding
problem in the representation of object and scene structure (Edelman, 1999; Clark, 2000; Edelman, 2002;
Edelman and Intrator, 2003). In particular, various components of a scene or an object need not be bound to
each other in any special manner, as long as each of them is bound to its proper location in the visual space,
merely by virtue of its appearance there.
The spatial scaffolding approach to the representation of visual structure is consistent with the om-
nipresence in the monkey inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex of what+where neurons, which are both
shape-tuned (signaling what is the stimulus), and location-selective (signaling where it appears) (Rao et al.,
1997; Op de Beeck and Vogels, 2000). On a larger scale, the neural substrate of the perceptually deﬁned
external space may be the cortical surface itself, as indicated by the ubiquity of map-like representations
(Gallistel, 1990) in vision (Ward et al., 2002), olfaction (Joerges et al., 1997), and audition (Shamma, 2001).
2.2 Spatial representations for language
In those areas of the human brain that support language, the counterpart to the visual what+where neurons
may be what+when neurons, tuned to particular structures appearing in a particular sequence (as illustrated
in Figure 2). The possible role of temporal response properties of neuron assemblies in implementing
sequence-sensitive processing has been discussed by Pulverm¨ uller (Pulverm¨ uller, 2002); parallels between
the brain representations of space and time in vision and in audition have been pointed out, among others,
by Shamma (Shamma, 2001).
Indeed, in recent years space has been conjectured to play a central role both in linguistics and in cogni-
tion in general. Consider, for example, the notion of iconicity in syntax (Simone, 1995): “...not only motor
but also cognitive operations such as language, which do not appear to have any intrinsic spatial organiza-
tion, are maintained in registration with spatial systems, and [...] this attention-requiring linkage confers
a processing advantage” (Coslett, 1999). The iconicity hypothesis is intimately connected to Construction
Grammar: linguistic freezes or prefabs (Landsberg, 1995) that are spatially (or, equivalently, temporally; cf.
Figure 2) iconic become constructions when parameterized (Erman and Warren, 2000). Indeed, the patterns
and their associated equivalence classes in the ADIOS model (Solan et al., 2003b) are just such parameter-
ized constructions. Psycholinguistic and neuropsychological evidence in support of linguistic iconicity has
been recently reviewed in (Chatterjee, 2001).
Thus, examples of space-based representations, which abound both in vision and in language, show
that the goal of structure-sensitive processing by a distributed architecture is less forbidding than commonly
thought, and that it is already within reach of cognition-general principles and mechanisms. This should
not be surprising: functional (computation-level) analogies between language and vision suggest that the
need to deal with structure is not unique to the former (Minsky, 1985). For instance, the treatment of a
sentence with an embedded relative clause may be compared to the processing of a scene with occlusion
3(Figure 1, left; additional parallels are illustrated and discussed in Figure 1, right). A cognitive approach to
language, which is based on these foundations, and which casts the relevant computational, algorithmic and
implementational issues in cognition-general terms, is outlined in the next section.
3 Treatment of structure in computational cognitive linguistics
3.1 Computational approach: the Chorus of Phrases and Construction Grammar
When applied to language, the idea of a distributed representation of structure based on similarities to
multiple structured exemplars (called the Chorus of Fragments in the setting of visual scene processing
(Edelman and Intrator, 2003)) translates into a Chorus of Phrases: a redundant ensemble of potentially
overlapping, mutually reinforcing phrase fragments that, as Langacker puts it, “motivate” the sentence they
cover:
“...rather than seeing a composite structure as an ediﬁce constructed out of smaller compo-
nents, we can treat it as a coherent structure in its own right: component structures are not the
building blocks out of which it is assembled, but function instead to motivate various aspects of
it.” (Langacker, 1987), p.453; italics in the original.
A simpliﬁed illustration of the Chorus of Phrases (COPH) in action is shown in Figure 2, where a stimulus
(which could be an entirely novel sentence) evokes a cloud of associations, pointing to snippets of previously
encountered phrases, each of which approximately matches parts of the input, and which together cover all
of it.
On the abstract, computational (Marr and Poggio, 1977)) level, the view of language as based on struc-
tural generalization, exempliﬁed by the COPH approach, differs radically from that of generative theories
such as the Minimalist Program (Lasnik, 2002), which attempt to describe language in terms of syntax pro-
jected by the lexicon. We may recall that the basic theoretical challenge at the computational level is to
specify what is it that needs to be done in the given task — in the present case, in language comprehen-
sion and production. According to the COPH framework, comprehension involves constructing a distributed
representation of the stimulus in terms of its structure-dependent similarities to multiple stored exemplars,
which convey information both about form (the exemplars are, generally, patterns with slots; see Figure 2)
and about meaning. Production consists of letting a set of exemplars chosen for their semantics interact and
constrain each other until a fully speciﬁed linear sequence of terminals is ready for output.
This distributed approach, which does not distinguish between syntactic and semantic representations
and processes, is broadly compatible with the tenets of the Cognitive school in linguistics (Langacker, 1987),
and, more speciﬁcally, with Construction Grammar (Goldberg, 1998; Goldberg, 2003; Croft, 2001). COPH
is, however, more than a mere metaphor for constructions, for several reasons. First, COPH is deeply
rooted in computational principles (multidimensional similarityspaces, distributed representations) andneu-
ral mechanisms (receptive ﬁelds and maps) that proved instrumental in analyzing other aspects of cognition.
Second, by steering the goals of syntactic (and semantic) analysis towards those of cognition in general,
COPH brings to the fore a collection of mathematical tools hitherto not considered by linguists (see Ap-
pendix: Mathematical Tools). Third, an implemented model of language acquisition and processing situ-
ated within the COPH framework provides empirical support and constraints for the construction grammar
theories, as described brieﬂy below.
43.2 Algorithmic and implementational issues: the ADIOS model
The pattern acquisition algorithm behind this working model of language acquisition and processing (Solan
et al., 2003b; Solan et al., 2004a) (ADIOS, or Automatic DIstillation Of Structure) learns, in an unsupervised
fashion, a streamlined representation of linguistic structures from untagged, large-scale natural-language
corpora. The algorithm represents sentences as paths on a graph whose vertices are words. Signiﬁcant
patterns are deﬁned as sets of paths in which a common preﬁx and sufﬁx form a context surrounding a
slot where distributionally equivalent (Harris, 1954) elements may appear. Such patterns, determined by
recursive context-sensitive statistical inference, form new vertices. Linguistic constructions are encoded
by trees composed of signiﬁcant patterns and their associated equivalence classes. An entire utterance
is typically represented by several such constructions (a Chorus of Phrases; cf. Figure 2), which may be
activated to different degrees, depending on their ﬁt to the input. Previously unseen inputs are processed by
pursuing structural and lexical similarities to familiar patterns.
The probabilistic principle that drives the context-sensitive, hierarchical pattern abstraction process in
the ADIOS model is closely related both to the notion of “suspicious coincidences” long thought to be
the key to unsupervised learning in neural systems (Barlow, 1959; Barlow, 1989) and to the Minimum
Description Length (MDL) criterion for representational efﬁciency (Bienenstock et al., 1997). Intuitively,
two elements — such as two members of a potential linguistic construction or two fragments of a visual
object — belong together to the extent that the probability of their joint appearance is higher than the product
of the probabilities of their individual appearances; coding such elements as one results in a more concise
representation. It has been conjectured that these principles, which can support structured learning in vision
(Barlow, 1990; Edelman et al., 2002a; Edelman et al., 2002b) and in language (Bienenstock et al., 1997;
Clark, 2001; Solan et al., 2003b), may provide “common foundations for cortical computation” (Phillips
and Singer, 1997).
The implemented ADIOS model has been subjected to extensive tests, some of which focused on the
acquisitionofartiﬁciallanguagesgeneratedbycontext-freegrammars(CFG),andothers—onlearningfrom
real natural-language corpora (CHILDES (MacWhinney and Snow, 1985)). The CFG experiments involved
two ADIOS instances: a teacher and a student. In each of the multiple runs, the teacher was pre-loaded with a
ready-made context free grammar (using the straightforward translation of CFG rules into ADIOS patterns),
then used to generate a series of training corpora with up to 6400 sentences, each with up to seven levels
of recursion. After training in each run i, a student-generated test corpus C
(i)
learned of size 10000 was used
in conjunction with a test corpus C
(i)
target of the same size produced by the teacher, to calculate precision
and recall. This was done by running the teacher as a parser on C
(i)
learned and the student – as a parser
on C
(i)
target. The results — nearly 100% precision and about 95% recall – indicate a substantial capacity
for unsupervised induction of context-free grammars even from very small corpora (Solan et al., 2004b).
Promising performance has also been demonstrated for real-life language: in the CHILDES experiments,
an instance of the model that had been trained on transcribed speech of parents directed to small children
performed at the level of an 8-year old in the CASL tests of grammaticality judgment (Carrow-Woolfolk,
1999). The same model also attained a level of performance considered to be “intermediate” for 9th-grade
students when subjected to a standard test of English as a Second Language (ESL) proﬁciency (Solan et al.,
2003b).
53.3 Open questions
Some of the exciting open issues in cognition that the proposed framework places within reach of empirical
research are outlined next.
Linking psycholinguistics to visual psychophysics. Recent psycholinguistic evidence indicates that lis-
teners and readers routinely settle for “good enough” representations of the linguistic material they face,
rather than seeking an exhaustive parse or even just a fully disambiguated semantic interpretation (Bever
et al., 1998; Ferreira et al., 2002; Sanford and Sturt, 2002); cf. Figure 1, right. How do these ﬁndings re-
late to the cluster of phenomena in visual psychophysics known as “change blindness” (Simons and Levin,
1997), which indicate that subjects do not fully parse visual scenes either?
From the “big picture” to the neural mechanisms. Marr’s framework calls for equal attention to the
computation- and the neurobiology-level understanding of cognition. On an abstract, computational level,
construction-based approaches — in particular the Chorus of Phrases — readily integrate themselves into
the rest of cognition, offering along the way a useful insight into the relationship between the ﬁnal rep-
resentational product of language and that of vision. Goldberg’s thesis (“constructions all the way down”
(Goldberg, 2003)) can be taken to imply that the Chorus of Phrases evoked by an utterance or a text is just
about all there is to its interpretation. There is a clear parallel between this stance and the conjecture that in
vision the Chorus of Fragments is an adequate, and in fact the only reasonable, bottom line (Edelman, 2002).
On the level of mechanism, however, the details have yet to be worked out. A crucial question is whether or
not it is possible to avoid altogether the need to manipulate constructions dynamically, rather than through
a pre-wired network. This is important because the act of binding a variable to a value (or inserting a con-
stituent into a construction) dynamically is deeply problematic in the context of a neural implementation
(Edelman and Intrator, 2003).
Between the mechanism and the virtual machine. The ability of humans to do algebra or to program
computers attests to the existence of some mechanism in the brain that at least creates the semblance of dy-
namic binding. People, however, must be trained for years before they become good at this kind of symbol
manipulation, and it would be prudent to make it a means of last resort in a theory of any cognitive phe-
nomenon that is more mundane than programming in Lisp. The same consideration applies to a related issue,
recursion: although it has been recently reafﬁrmed by some linguists as the epitome of human uniqueness
(Hauser et al., 2002), humans are notoriously bad at deep recursion (Gibson and Thomas, 1999) (and shal-
low recursion, as well as the manipulation of complexity-controlled constructions, can be handled by ﬁnite
means such as the ADIOS representation (Solan et al., 2003b)). These considerations suggest that dynamic
binding and deep recursion may both be supported in the brain by a virtual machine (cf. (Dennett, 1991),
p.209) that is difﬁcult to build and expensive to maintain and operate, and that is at least once removed from
the neural mechanisms that are so good at supporting everyday cognition.
4 Conclusions
Computational cognitive science holds that a comprehensive theory of any information processing task must
lead to its understanding on several levels of abstraction (Marr and Poggio, 1977). Although distinct, these
levels cannot be studied independently, lest theorizing loses touch with psychological and neurobiological
6reality, or, conversely, the neurobiology becomes too myopic (Edelman, 1999). Accordingly, the framework
for computational cognitive linguistics outlined here is informed by the top-down computational and algo-
rithmic principles of context-dependent probabilistic learning and is based on a bottom-up implementational
scheme that is ubiquitous in the brain: computing with connections, which carry dynamically unfolding neu-
ral activation patterns and which support low-dimensional, distributed, redundant, graded representations.
The vision of language it offers should boost cognitively oriented theories such as Construction Grammar
(Croft, 2001; Goldberg, 2003) and help connect them to rich repositories of computational knowledge (from
learning theory, probability and information, and natural language processing) and empirical data (from
psychophysics and neuroscience) about the brain.
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Appendix: Mathematical Tools for Computational Cognitive Linguistics
From the standpoint of methodology, a computationally motivated approach to cognitive linguistics does
not imply pitching “mathematics versus psychology” (an expression used by Tomasello as a section heading
in his introduction to The New Psychology of Language (Tomasello, 1998), p.ix). Rather, the usual tools
of mathematical linguistics (such as formal languages, λ-calculus and symbolic logic) should be traded in
for new ones. Some of these, which proved well-suited for analyzing distributed representations in various
areas of cognition, are listed below.
Syntax: from constituent trees to string cover. Computational learning theory offers various tools ca-
pable of dealing with distributed, potentially overcomplete (Chen and Donoho, 1994) representations of
sequence data. One of these is string kernels, a representation that tallies the occurrences of speciﬁc sym-
bols in speciﬁc locations, and supports reasoning about global properties of the sequence probed in this
manner and, in particular, about features that can help classify it (Lodhi et al., 2001). Similar methods are
increasingly in demand in computational biology, because of the sequential nature of the data in both do-
mains, and, speciﬁcally, because of the close analogy between text analysis by the identiﬁcation of multiple,
overlapping local patterns on the one hand, and hybridization approaches to DNA sequencing on the other
12hand. Recent developments in this ﬁeld include derivations of the algorithmic complexity of specifying a
string by its substrings (Skiena and Sundaram, 1995; Jiang and Li, 1996; Iliopoulos and Smyth, 1998). This
approach is distinct from (and more relevant for our present purposes than) treebank-based parsing (com-
bining multiple local or partial parse trees (Joshi and Schabes, 1997; Bod, 1998)) in that the cover it seeks
need be neither precise nor exclusive.
Semantics: fromfunctionstoconstructionsandrelations. AccordingtotheChorusofPhrasesmetaphor
(Figure 2), the representation of a sentence by an ensemble of active units can be approximately described
as a relation (namely, as the subset of units whose activity exceeds some threshold). As in Construction
Grammar (Goldberg, 2003), this representation captures both semantic and syntactic information about the
input. Interestingly, recent work in computational semantics addressing various problematic aspects of com-
positionality suggests that systematicity of meaning is better served by deﬁning meaning as a relation over
sentence parts (Zadrozny, 1994) (rather than as a function of the parts, as stipulated by the classical, Fregean
approach).
Acquisition: from parameter setting to structure discovery. The ascendancy of the generative grammar
and its accompanying innateness postulate over competing distributional and behaviorist ideas in the 1960s
can be ascribed in a large part to the inadequacy of the contemporary statistical inference methods and the
perceived inability of association-based learning to handle recursion. Statistics, however, need not be limited
to counting word frequencies: in computer science, the integration of advanced statistical inference (includ-
ing Bayesian methods, the Minimum Description Length principle and other related information-theoretic
tools), progress in computational learning theory, efﬁcient algorithms, and cheap hardware led to important
conceptual progress, as well as to practical achievements (Manning and Sch¨ utze, 1999). Likewise, learning
need not be limited to the establishment of pairwise associations: bounded-depth recursively structured pat-
terns can be learned from examples, by efﬁcient algorithms that rely on modern statistical inference (Solan
et al., 2003b; Solan et al., 2004a) (see (Clark, 2001) for an overview of the recent progress in this ﬁeld).
13hath become the head
the stone     of the corner
that
   the
      builders
         rejected
Figure 1: Left: there is a task-level analogy between interpreting a composite scene with occlusion and
the processing of a sentence that contains an embedded relative clause (adapted from M. Minsky (Minsky,
1985), p.269). The existence of such analogies between vision and language on the abstract level of the
computational tasks (Marr and Poggio, 1977) faced by the brain, along with the uniformity of the underly-
ing low-level cortical mechanisms (Phillips and Singer, 1997), suggests that cross-cognition commonalities
should be sought also on the algorithmic level. Right: the postcard shown here (Apolin` ere Enameled by
M. Duchamp) can be used to make the same point about parallels between language and vision (cf. the
occlusion of the girl’s legs by the bed-frame), and more. For instance, Duchamp’s painting could be repre-
sented (and understood) in terms of its local similarities to various familiar images (Chorus of Fragments
(Edelman, 2002; Edelman and Intrator, 2003)), which need not match the scene perfectly (Edelman, 1999);
likewise, an utterance could be represented (and understood) in terms of the cloud of constructions (Chorus
of Phrases (Solan et al., 2003b)) it evokes, as illustrated in Figure 2. Furthermore, just as many viewers
fail to notice that the bed in this scene would be useless (look closely at the frame), subjects exposed to
ungrammatical sentences of moderate complexity may rate them as no less felicitous than similarly struc-
tured grammatical ones (e.g., the sentence “The apartment that the maid who the service had sent over was
well decorated” tends to be rated as no worse (Gibson and Thomas, 1999) – and, in some settings, better
(Christiansen and MacDonald, 2003) – than “The apartment that the maid who the service had sent over
was cleaning every week was well decorated”; cf. (Gibson and Pearlmutter, 1998; Chipere, 1997; Chipere,
2001)).
14I read the news today, oh boy, about a lucky man who made the grade.
hey, you made the grade
in the news today, an Idaho man
oh boy, what a shame
you lucky, lucky bastard
the news at ten
about a boy
I already read the newspaper
I  heard   a story about a man
dost thou know who made thee
not the 9 o’clock news
read
saw
watched
space/time
activation
phrasal patterns
Figure 2: An illustration of the Chorus of Phrases in sentence processing (for actual examples produced
by the ADIOS model, see (Solan et al., 2003a; Solan et al., 2003b)). An input sentence is shown along
with a subset of phrases it evokes from memory, each of which matches some word, sequence of words,
or, generally, a parameterized pattern (in cartouche: I heard, read, saw, watched a story
about a man) in the input. The unfolding of each pattern’s activation (which reﬂects its time-domain
“receptive ﬁeld”) may be important (Pulverm¨ uller, 2002), but even without it the ensemble of active patterns
is a highly informative representation (just as its counterparts in vision are (Edelman, 1999; Edelman and
Intrator, 2003)). The members of the ensemble disambiguate each other by supplying multiple interacting
constraints on the interpretation. Consequently, it should be possible to process various queries about the
input, both syntactic (voice, aspect, etc.) and semantic (thematic, connotational, conceptual). Moreover, it
may be possible to use for that purpose generic cortical mechanisms (Phillips and Singer, 1997; Maass et al.,
2003) that would map the distributed phrase activation patterns onto the corresponding required outputs, as
in the scenario of function approximation found across cognition (Poggio, 1990; Intrator and Edelman,
1997). From the computational standpoint, it is interesting to observe that one can reconstruct the input
sentence itself, should that be required for some reason, from a number of subsequence (phrase or pattern)
queries that is on the order of nlogα + αlogn, where n is the length of the sentence and α is the size of
the lexicon (Skiena and Sundaram, 1995). This computational complexity, which is quite benign in view of
the α-fold parallelism inherent in a distributed lexicon, can be further reduced by allowing approximate (in
Valiant’s sense (Valiant, 1984)) matching (Jiang and Li, 1996).
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